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Since 2000 Germany has a fairly unique market mechanism to trade milk quotas between 
dairy farms. The two major features are: (1) a quasi auctioning system that produces excess 
demands which are covered by state reserves free of charge and (2) a price band is used to 
exclude high price bids. For both features an experimental design is developed to study their 
impact in comparison to a regular seller’s sealed bid double auction. Results show that both 
treatments lead to significant misallocations. These are due the direct impact of regulations 
and due to an imperfect adjustment of bidding functions towards them. The major goal of the 





Keywords: Double Auction, Experiment, Milk Quota, Germany 




Copyright 2010 by Bernhard Brümmer, Jens-Peter Loy, and Till Requate. All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, provided this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
                                                 
1 Jens-Peter Loy is Professor for Market Analysis at the Department of Agricultural Economics at the Christian-
Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany; Till Requate is Professor for Innovation, Competition and New 
Institutions at the Department of Economics at the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany; Bernhard 
Brümmer is Professor for Market Analysis at the Department of Agricultural Economics at the Georg-August-
University in Göttingen, Germany. 2 
 
Introduction 
In 1984 the European Union introduced a quota system to limit milk production in the 
Member States. Economies of scale and technical progress have set incentives for competitive 
farms to grow constantly; thus, there is an inherent need to trade milk quotas between dairy 
farms. Quota exchanges were regulated from the start and differed between EU member states 
up till now; however, at the end of the 1990’s many regulations had been lifted in Germany 
where in April 2000 a fundamentally new system to exchange milk quotas was introduced. A 
quasi double auctioning system was installed at a regional level. All other forms of 
transactions such as renting, leasing or other contracts to transfer quota between farmers were 
banned. The new quota exchange system is similar to a single price multiple unit seller’s 
sealed bid double auction (SBDA). Specific regulations were added to limit prices and to 
reduce problems of excess supply or demand. Three major features describe the 
characteristics of the market mechanism. First, a single preliminary price is set at the 
minimum excess demand which is calculated from ordered bids and asks submitted at each of 
three auctioning dates per year. Second, if there are successful bids that exceed the 
preliminary price by more than 40 percent (and the price is above 30 Euro cent per liter), then 
those exceeding bids are cancelled and price calculations start over again for one more time 
(Treatment 2). Third, local authorities control some state reserves of milk quotas. These 
quotas can used to fill the excess demands that systematically occur in the auctions. Quotas 
taken from state reserves are given to bidders free of charge. Every successful bidder receives 
the same share with respect to his/her bid volume. Thus, if the excess demand makes for 
example 10 percent of the trade volume, then each bidder gets 10 percent of his/her bid free of 
charge (Treatment 3). We analyze the two scenarios by comparing their results to the outcome 
of a SBDA (Treatment 1). 
In multiple unit bid auctions with sufficiently many bidders on both sides truth telling is a 
weak dominant strategy (Nautz, 1995; Nautz und Wolfram, 1997; McAfee, 1992). The SBDA 
auction design severs as a benchmark to analyze the two scenarios for German milk quota 
exchanges described above. As the optimal competitive bidding functions under Treatment 1 
and 2 cannot be derived easily in theory, we use simulations instead. In the second step 
auction experiments are set up in a computer lab to study the real world performance of the 
market mechanism. Each experiment for the two scenarios is run with 16 student of which 
randomly assigned 6 serve as sellers and 10 as buyers of milk quota. Each participant receives 
a willingness to buy or sell in each of the 28 rounds played. In each round bids are placed, 
prices are calculated, and gains and losses due to transactions performed are assigned and are 
notified for each participant. Students receive a fixed and a variable payment which on 
average is about 10 Euro per participant. One experiment with 28 rounds and three test runs 
takes about 60 minutes. Each design (Treatment 2 and 3) is repeated 5 times with different 
students. Willingness to pay and to sell are taken from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 
which fits the scale of real quota prices in Germany. These parameters are also used in the 
theoretical simulations to generate optimal bidding functions. 
The paper is organized as follows: We first describe and analyze the functioning of milk quota 
exchanges in Germany. Following, the experimental design for ht three treatments used is 
developed and the experimental set up is explained. In section 3 optimal bidding behavior and 
expected results are derived and discussed. In section 4 we analyze the experimental results 
with respect to the theoretical expectations and measure the variations between the treatments 




German Milk Quota Exchanges 
While most regulations regarding the milk quota system are set at the EU level, the rules for 
the exchanging quotas between farmers are decided at the national level. Consequently the 
applied rules differ significantly between member states. After the introduction of the quota 
system in 1984 the exchange of quotas between farmers was initially very restrictive. Quotas 
could only be transferred when also a specified acreage of grassland was transferred. 
However, regulations were liberalized over time and at the end of the millennium farmers 
could either buy, rent, or lease quotas without any additional obligations within the regional 
territories of dairy companies, in particular only farmers that deliver to the same dairy plant 
could exchange quotas. Trade was generally organized by professional quota brokers. In 2000 
the German Minister of Agriculture started a new initiative to trade milk quotas through state 
organized exchanges that are held three times a year. Instead of limiting exchanges to the 
regional territories of the dairy companies, Germany was divided into 21 regions, for which 
separate exchanges were set up. The regions are mainly congruent with the state territories. 
Only in Bavaria and in Baden-Württemberg certain sub-territories were used the called 
Regierungsbezirke. From 2007 on regions are aggregated into East and West Germany, for 
which separate exchanges are run. Since 2000 with only a very few exceptions all trades have 
to go through the state exchanges. Also renting and leasing of quotas were banned. 
The exchanges are organized as quasi double auctions. Bids and asks are submitted by 
farmers to the exchanges which then decide a single price and the quantity that is traded. All 
bidders have to prove that they can afford to buy quotas (bids) or that they are in possession 
of the quota they intend to sell (asks). All bidders can submit only one bid. Trading rules have 
been changed a few times between 2000 and 2002. Since then the following procedure is 
applied. First, incoming asks and bids are ranked by priority and cumulated. Second, starting 
with the minimum bid/ask, the market excess quantity (cumulative bids minus cumulative 
asks) is determined for every Eurocent increment up to the maximum bid/ask. The 
preliminary price is set where the minimum excess demand is reached for the first time or at 
the lowest price. Third, if the preliminary price is lower than 30 Eurocent, then it is equal to 
the final price. If the preliminary price is above 30 Eurocent and if there are bids higher than 
1.4 times the preliminary price, then those bids are deleted and the price determination starts 
again. The second round will always be the final round. If there are no such bids, then again 
preliminary and final price correspond. Fourth, after the preliminary price is found and the 
excess demand is determined, it is decided whether all bids are cut by the same share with 
respect to bid volumes to reach equilibrium (supply equals demand) or whether the state 
reserve is used to fill the gap. If the state reserve has a sufficient amount of milk quota, it is 
generally used. In this case every bidder receives the same share of the excess demand 
according to his/her bid volume free of charge.
2 
To illustrate the price setting and transaction rules on German milk quota exchanges, we use 
the following example with four bids and four asks. On a regular double Auction (k-multiple 
unit double auction) the equilibrium price is set in the range between: 
        
*
11 min , 1 max , mn nm pk b a k a b  with 

    11 , a n d   , nm n m ab a b n m        (1) 
 
* : Equilibrium price;  0,1 ; : Bids ordered descending; : Asks ordered ascending. pk b a   
                                                 
2 Legal reasons prevent from charging farmers that receive milk quotas out of the state reserve. The state reserve 
is filled for instance when farmers cancel renting contract that have been closed before 2000. Such contracts 
were valid after the introduction of the quota exchanges and the banning of renting quotas. They could also be 
prolonged with the same parties. However, when one of the parties cancelled the contract, the quota cannot be 
rented to another party. If then sold through the respective exchange, one third of the quota is claimed by the 
state and goes into the state reserve. 4 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the k-multiple unit double auction and the 
pricing rule on German milk quota exchanges 
 
Legend: P*/Q*: Equilibrium for a k-multiple unit double auction. PMB: Preliminary price. 
PMB*: Final price. ES: Excess supply. ED: Excess Demand. A: Ask. B: Bid with prices and 
volumes in parentheses. 
Source: Own. 
 
For a SBDA k would be 0 and thereby the single price would be the lower bound of the range 
marked as p* in Figure 1. The equilibrium quantity for a SBDA is Q* which is always at the 
intersection of the bid functions.
3 In our example in Figure 1 P* is 60 and Q* is 60. On 
German milk quota exchanges the preliminary price is set at the minimum excess demand 
which is at a price of 50. The equilibrium quantity would still be 60 and the excess demand 
would have to be filled out of the state reserve. However, in this case the bid A exceeds the 
preliminary price by more than 40 percent; thus, bid A is not considered for the final price 
equilibrium. Graphically, all other bids move to the left till B reaches the y-axis. The final 
price is set at 40. Bid D is now newly considered; the equilibrium demand is now at 80 and 
supply is as before at 50. The excess demand of 30 is taken from the state reserve and 
distributed between the successful bidders with the same share according to their bid volume. 
Bidder B for instance bids for 20 units. As the relative excess demand accounts for 37.5 
percent of the total volume of successful bids, every bidder receives 37.5 percent of the bid 
volume from the state reserve free of charge. Thereby the net price for bidders drops to 25. 
Both regulation lead to lower prices and trade (supply) volumes. Trade losses occur by the 
reduction in supply and the exclusion of high value bids. 
                                                 
3 Bidding functions generally characterize the relationship between bids and the underlying true valuations. The 
ordered bids are sometimes called the same. To distinguish the two terms here, we call the ordered bids a bid 





























As many goods and factors in the real world milk quotas have attributes of both private and 
common values. However, in modeling different regulations on German milk quota 
exchanges we assume private values to be the dominant factor here. This view is support by 
the argument “valuation of milk quotas is highly dependent on farm specific characteristics 
including production costs, capacity constraints etc.“ (Bogetoft et al. (2003): 197). The studies 
undertaken so far in this particular field have to our knowledge followed this approach 
(Doyon et al., 2008; Bogetoft et al., 2003; Brümmer and Loy, 2003). 
The German milk quota exchanges limit or ban any trading after the auction has closed. Thus, 
bidders in the experiment always have only one shot for finding their optimal outcome in each 
round in the respective setting, the auction is non sequential. 
To investigate the major interventions on German milk quota exchanges we run three 
treatments. First, the reference treatment is the SBDA illustrated in Figure 1. The equilibrium 
price is determined according to equation 1 and k is equal to zero, the excess demand or 
supply is found at the intersection of the bidding functions. To ensure the trade equilibrium 
the bids with the lowest priority are used to equalize the market excess. 
Second, we model the impact of the state reserve policy by setting equilibrium prices at the 
minimum excess demand which is then filled by the state reserve. Every bidder receives 
according to his/her bid volume the same share out of the state reserve. The share is 
determined by the relative excess demand which equals on minus the total supply divided by 
the total demand of successful bidders. In the example in Figure 1 every bidder gets 37.5 
percent of their bid volume for free out of the state reserve. 
Third, we add a price band for bids to the reference treatment. We calculate a preliminary 
price according to the SBDA rule and check whether some bids exceed this price by more 
than 40 percent. Those bids are deleted and the price is determined by the same rule again. 
The price band is applied only once. Thus, the price determined after deleting bids is always 
the final price. 
For the three treatments we ran lab experiments with students at the Faculty of Agriculture in 
their first year. The experiments were promoted during lecture time and interested students 
could sign up for participation for one treatment and session only. Each experiment is run 
with 16 students. 6 students are assigned to be selling quota and 10 to be buying quota. 
Individuals were assigned the role of buyer or seller at random by drawing the number of the 
working station. Every student worked at a computerized workstation to receive and submit 
information during the experiment. For each scenario five repetitions (sessions) with different 
participants were run. In each session, the experiment and the scenario were briefly explained 
before written instructions were handed out to every participant. The instruction could be 
studied for 15 minutes and questions could be asked and were answered by the instructor 
before the start of the session. The experiment then began with three trial runs in which 
students tested the functioning of the procedure. In each round every participant receives a 
willingness to pay or sell and the volume wanted to buy or sell on screen. Bids and asks are 
drawn from random distributions. Prices come from an equal distribution between 0 and 100. 
Volumes are drawn from equal distributions between 1 and 9 for buyers and between 1 and 19 
for sellers. We choose a rather simple distribution to make calculations and the process of 
expectations easier to grasp for participants. After receiving their valuations participants place 
their bids/asks. Afterwards they receive results for the equilibrium prices and the information 
whether or not their bids/asks were accepted on the screen. For the successful bidders the 
account information is recalculated by the amount of “money” that was made or lost through 
the trade. After three trial rounds the experiment is started over again for the 28 rounds of the 
real experiments. In the end the account balance of each participant is taken to calculate the 
expense allowance that was paid in cash after the session. On average the entire sessions 6 
 
lasted about one hour and the average expense allowance was about 10 Euros per participant. 
For treatment 2 and 3 we ran 5 sessions, treatment 1 was repeated 3 times. 
Optimal bidding 
The reference scenario used here is a SBDA which is similar to the P/Q mechanism originally 
introduced by Shubik (1977). For this mechanism various properties can be shown such that 
each competitive equilibrium (CE) has corresponding to it a Nash-Equilibrium and thereby is 
called incentive efficient (Wilson, 1985). However, the competitive equilibrium is not a 
natural outcome of the game, in particular when it is non sequential. Smith et al (1982). for 
instance come to the conclusion that the P/Q mechanism converges close to the CE, but might 
be better described by a monopoly-monopsony equilibrium in which buyers and sellers 
withhold their demand and supply respectively to manipulate the price is their preferred 
direction. The efficiency is lower than in regular oral double auction; however, this result 
changes with more experienced subjects in the experiments (Smith et al, 1982) Overall, 
convergence to CE for the oral double auction is reached quickly after some periods of trading 
(Plott, 1982). For the P/Q mechanism strategic bids converge to efficient bids as the number 
of bidders grows with a rate of convergence that is close to one by the number of bidders 
(Gong and Preston McAfee, 1996; Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989). That implies that the 
one shot equilibrium might systematically as well as randomly deviate from the CE.
4 
Nonetheless, we will employ this scenario for comparison, as it is very similar to the 
mechanisms studied, it is an operable alternative, and is likely to be more efficient than the 
designs used in Treatments 2 and 3. We also use the “deterministic” CE as a second 
reference.
5  Truth telling would be a dominant strategy, when participants act as price takers 
(Nautz, 1995). 
Starting with this assumption we derive the optimal bidding rule for the second treatment. In a 
competitive bidding environment, seller’s bids should not be affected by the rules in the 
Treatments 2 and 3. Buyers on the contrary receive a certain share   of quota out of the state 
reserves free of charge; thus, bid prices should increase by 
1
1  
 to reflect the full valuation 
for the milk quota bought through the exchange which in only part of the quota received in 
total. As valuations and volumes are drawn from random distributions, bidders have to 
calculate an expected value for . An initial guess might be derived as following: The 
average bid is 5 units and so might be the average excess demand. Supply and demand 
intersect at half of average total demand and supply which is between 25 and 30 (Figure 2). 
Thus, the relative excess demand might be between 16 to 20 percent. Though this estimation 
is not consistent, simulations indicate that the relative excess demand is about 20 percent. In 
Table 1, average results for 100.000 repetitions are shown. 
Optimal bidding in Treatment 3 is again only relevant to buyers. Considering that the average 
equilibrium price might be close to 40 ct (Figure 2), a first rule might be that buyers restrict 





                                                 
4 “Since everything from electrons, stars and rats to people yield state measure subject to “error” or random 
variations the deterministic criterion (CE) can have no serious scientific standing.” (Smith et al., 1982: 201). 
5 In the CE all bidders truthfully reveal their valuations. 7 
 
Table 1: Simulation of Treatment 1 and 2 
 
 
Legend: Excess: In Treatment 1:  Absolute excess demand or supply / total demand. In 
Treatment 2: Excess demand / total demand. Welfare B(A): Trade gains of all buyers/sellers. 
Source: Own. 
 
Figure 2: Expected bids and asks in the simulation 
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In Table 2 we summarize the average behavior and outcome over all rounds and for each 
treatment in the experiment. Additionally, we differentiate between the initial and the final 
rounds to estimate the impact of learning or bidding strategy improving. In the reference 
SBDA scenario (Treatment 1), bidders perform significant bid shading. On the supply side the 
willingness to sell (WPs) is overstated by average asks (Ask) by about 6 percent and on the 
demand side average bids (Bid) undermine the willingness to pay (WPb) by also 6 percent 
(Table 2). The bid shading predominantly occurs on the supply side at low valuations and on 
the demand side at high valuations (Figure 3). Also the bid volumes are lower with respect to 
the average given demand and supply (Qs-AskQ/Qb-BidQ). The reduction in supply is higher 
than in demand even in relative terms. Smith et al. (1982) describe this behavior as an attempt 
to exercise market power. As there are only 6 participants on the supply side and 10 on the 
demand side, the stronger reduction on supply side appears to be rational. 
Price Volume Excess Welfare BW e l f a r e  AT o t a l  Welfare
ct t % ct ct ct
Treatment 1 (SBDA) 43.83 26.67 0.23 758.76 450.16 1208.92
Treatment 2 without state reserve 40.48 23.06 0.20 692.59 384.10 1076.69
Treatment 2 43.92 25.42 0.19 974.53 464.03 1438.56












In comparison to Treatment 1 the supply side strategy is not affected by the design of 
Treatment 2 and 3. This is reflected by almost the same extent of bid shading in volumes 
under Treatment 2 and 3 (Qs-AskQ). Average asks on the contrary have changed and reflect 
now almost their true valuations (WPs-Ask). Their slight deviation mirrors the direction that 
is observed for the demand side. The magnitude is significantly smaller which might indicate 
that a few bidders have applied the demand strategy to the supply. 
On the demand side the bid reduction in volume is slightly higher on average in Treatment 2 
and 3. Bid prices, however, change significantly. In Treatment 2 (state reserve) as bidders 
expect to receive quota free of charge, average bids overstate the willingness to pay. In 
comparison to Treatment 1 the change is about 8 percent. In Treatment 3 bidders expect to be 
punished for high bids; thus the bid shading becomes more pronounced by about 10 percent 
compared with Treatment 1. On average bids are 8 ct lower that the true valuation of bidders.  
Due to the regulations in Treatment 2 and 3, trade prices and volume decrease with respect to 
the reference scenario. Prices go down by 8 (12) percent in Treatment 2 (3); volumes decrease 
by 12 (32) percent. In Treatment 2 the decrease in trade volumes equal the reductions in 
supply. Because of the state reserve the average total demand transferred to bidders is about 5 
units or 20 percent higher than the supply. This was about to be expected by the simulations 
runs presented in the previous chapter. Therefore, net prices decrease by also 20 percent from 
43 to 35 ct on average. 
The changes in the bidding behavior over time (session rounds) are derived from results for 
the first 10 and the final 10 rounds in the respective sessions and treatments. In Treatment 1 
the observed bid shading on the supply side increases for prices and decreases for volumes 
both significantly. Auctions average prices decrease and the trade volume increase which 
indicate a more competitive behavior. Though bid shading in prices increases, its impact on 
equilibrium might not be as severe because it occurs predominantly at high valuations (Figure 
3). Though in absolute smaller terms, the same developments are observed for the demand 
side bidders. In the final round bid volumes are close to the true demand quantities. 
Figure 3: Bid functions for Treatment 1 
 
Legend: WP: Willingness to sell/pay in ct/kg; Ask/ Bid: Bids in ct/kg; Results for Treatment 
one in Session 1. 
Source: Own. 
 
In Treatment 2 we only observe a change in the price bidding functions. The bid shading on 
the supply side slightly increases, while is strongly changes on the demand side. Due to the 
state reserve policy bidders start with almost true valuations on average (First 10 rounds) but 
end with a significant over valuation or negative bid shading (Final 10 Rounds). Bids are in 
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average valuation of bidders. That is still below the theoretical expectation of about 20 
percent. Considering a continuing rate of change with experimental repetitions, the expected 
percentage would have been reached in the next ten or twenty rounds. Trade volumes in the 
final rounds are higher and auction prices are lower compared to the first rounds; adjustments 
in the bidding function enable regaining of trade profits compared to SBDA mechanism. 




Legend: WPs/ WPb: Willingness to sell/pay in ct/kg; Ask/ Bid: Bids in ct/kg; Qs-AskQ/Qb-
BidQ: Difference between the true and revealed demand/supply. Price: Auction price; Trade: 
Auction trade volume (In Treatment 2 trade is equal to the supply volume, the excess demand 
is covered by the state reserve). 
Source: Own. 
 
Treatment 1T r e a t m e n t  2  Treatment 3
P/Q State Reserve Price Band
All Rounds
WPs 50.86 49.20 51.09
Ask 53.80 49.87 50.53
WPs‐Ask ‐2.94 ‐0.66 0.56
Qs‐AskQ 3.07 3.08 3.28
WPb 50.55 50.65 50.20
Bid 47.41 51.71 42.11
WPb‐Bid 3.14 ‐1.07 8.09
Qb‐BidQ 0.84 1.43 1.44
Price 47.19 43.40 41.46
Trade 27.85 24.68 19.01
First 10 Rounds
WPs 52.98 49.71 51.55
Ask 53.87 50.11 50.58
WPs‐Ask ‐0.88 ‐0.40 0.97
Qs‐AskQ 3.51 3.18 3.37
WPb 50.70 51.42 50.92
Bid 47.86 51.34 41.82
WPb‐Bid 2.84 0.08 9.10
Qb‐BidQ 1.01 1.37 1.35
Price 47.87 44.80 41.44
Trade 26.23 23.48 19.00
Last 10 Rounds
WPs 48.26 49.55 51.02
Ask 53.47 50.42 50.55
WPs‐Ask ‐5.21 ‐0.87 0.47
Qs‐AskQ 2.34 3.03 3.07
WPb 50.18 49.78 49.61
Bid 46.88 52.62 42.46
WPb‐Bid 3.30 ‐2.84 7.15
Qb‐BidQ 0.65 1.41 1.53
Price 46.17 42.96 41.74
Trade 29.17 24.02 19.8010 
 
Treatment 2 shows bid volumes on the supply and demand side very close between the first 
and the final rounds. The bid shading on the supply side is significantly reduced at a relatively 
low level. On the demand side the bid shading starts at a very high level. On average bids are 
9 ct or almost 20 percent below the true valuations. In the end the shading of bids drops to 7 ct 
on average. The reason might be that the estimation of the optimal bidding rule under this 
treatment is much more complex; thus, the reduction in bid shading might either a 
readjustment or is just another trial in order to match the optimum. Compared to the intuitive 
rule that all bids above a certain level are constant, the empirical bid function shows a 
considerable amount of high price bids. This is likely inefficient (Figure 4). Also many bids 
with same underlying valuations vary significantly indicating that either no clear bidding 
strategy is applied among participants or the strategies differ between them. 
In Treatment 3 the impact of price bands on the average price is about 2 ct or 4 percent of the 
average equilibrium price if we compare the results for the same bids with and without price 
bands. That means that even under the adjustment of bidding behavior a considerable amount 
of bids is deleted. These numbers and also the trade volume do not seem to improve over 
time; thus, there is likely no learning to be detected under this treatment. 
Figure 4: Bid functions for Treatment 3 
 
Legend: WP: Willingness to sell/pay in ct/kg; Ask/ Bid: Bids in ct/kg; Results for Treatment 




In the paper we design three different treatments to model and analyze the main features of 
German milk quota exchanges. The base treatment is a single price multiple unit seller’s 
sealed bid double auction which serves as a reference scenario to measure the impact of 
alternative regulations. The main features of the German milk quota exchanges are the state 
reserves that cover excess demands free of charge and the price bands that limit bids on the 
demand side. Both regulations aim at lowering equilibrium prices for quota buyers. 
We employed first year students in Agricultural Sciences at the University of Kiel to run the 
three different treatments. For each treatment 16 participants randomly assigned to 6 sellers 
and 10 buyers trade under the respective market designs. Incentives are given by trade profit 
based payments for each participant. 
Experimental results show that both regulations have a significant impact on equilibrium 
prices and trade volumes. In both designs the market outcomes (prices and volumes) 
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demand in Treatment 2 (state reserve). When the volume transferred by the state reserve is 
considered the total demand is higher than for the regular seller’s bid double auction. In 
particular the price band leads to a significant reduction in trade of about 30 percent. Thus, 
lower quota prices come at a significant cost of reduced trade gains. 
The experiments also show that participants do not efficiently adjust their bidding functions to 
the mechanisms in the treatments. Bid shading appears in the regular double auctions on both 
market sides and for prices and volumes. Though the supply side bid function is not affected 
by the treatments, a reduction in bid volume occurs in all treatments. The bidding price 
functions deviate slightly in the direction that is expected for the demand side which is not 
necessarily efficient for the demand side. On the demand side the expected direction of 
adjustments occurs. Bids are increased when state reserves cover the excess demand and 
reduced when price bands are applied. However, at least for the state reserve treatment the 
optimal adjustment is not accomplished. In all scenarios a similar bidding function applied by 
all bidders is missing which in addition is responsible for the observed inefficiencies. The 
trade losses that might be caused by randomness and/or other systematic factors could likely 
be corrected by continued trading. Also in the real world, the opening of at least alternative 
markets and transaction mechanisms might lead to improved trade performances. 
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